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I. INTRODUCTION
Whether bankruptcy courts can confirm reorganization plans that
permanently discharge the liability of nondebtor third parties, and if so,
under what circumstances, are topics of continuing debate in case law
and legal commentary.' The circuit courts of appeal are divided on
these issues, making them attractive for Supreme Court review.
In a Chapter 11 case, the debts of the bankrupt debtor are discharged
debts upon confirmation of a plan of reorganization.2 The provisions of
* This Note is dedicated to my parents, John and Teresa Inman, the best parents anyone
could ask for, and to Darren Vendetti. I also would like to thank John Goldsmith for his
assistance with the topic.
1. Some 40 cases have addressed whether a court can approve a reorganization plan that
purports to discharge nondebtor third parties from liability. See Peter E. Meltzer, Getting Out

of JailFree: Can the Bankruptcy PlanProcess Be Used to Release Nondebtor Parties?, 71 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 1, 1 n.1 (1997). More than 30 of these cases have been decided since 1988. See id.
2. 11 U.S.C. 1141(d)(1) (1994) provides:
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the plan bind all creditors, whether or not any particular creditor or class
of creditors objects to the plan.3 While the debtor's liabilities are
discharged upon confirmation of the Chapter 11 plan, creditors are
generally free to pursue all available remedies against other individuals
or entities obligated, along with the bankrupt debtor, for any of the
discharged debts.4 However, many reorganization plans contain release
provisions which purport to permanently discharge the liability of other
parties such as the bankrupt entity's insiders, partners, plan funders, or
other individuals or entities that contribute to the reorganization process
or reorganization funds.5 Without such releases from liability, presumably many of these parties would otherwise refuse to participate in or
contribute to the debtor's reorganization. The controversy over whether
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, in the plan, or in the order
confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan(A) discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such
confirmation, and any debt of a kind specified in section 502(g), 502(h), or 502(i)
of this title, whether or not(i) a proof of the claim based on such debt is filed or deemed filed under section
501 of this title;
(ii) such claim is allowed under section 502 of this title; or
(iii) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan; and
(B) terminates all rights and interests of equity security holders and general
partners provided for by the plan.
Id.
3. See In re Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F3d 1043, 1046 (7th Cir. 1993).
4. See Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Ropes & Gray, 65 F.3d 973, 979 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing
11 U.S.C. § 524(e)).
5. See Meltzer, supra note 1, at 2. The conflict only concerns whether courts have the
power to issue permanent injunctions discharging the liability of third-party nondebtors. There
is general consensus that § 105(a) empowers courts to issue temporary or preliminary injunctions
barring suits against nondebtor third parties in order to preserve the debtor estate. See, e.g.,
American Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp., 885 F.2d 621, 624-25 (9th Cir. 1989)
(citations omitted). In addition, § 105(a) has been used to extend the automatic stay of § 362(a)
to protect nondebtor third parties. See Meltzer, supra note 1, at 20-21.
Section 105 grants bankruptcy courts "ample power to enjoin actions excepted from
the automatic stay which might interfere in the rehabilitative process... " Further,
bankruptcy courts "may issue or extend stays to enjoin a variety of proceedings
which will have an adverse impact on the debtor's ability to formulate a Chapter
11 plan."
Myerson & Kuhn v. Brunswick Assoc. (In re Myerson & Kuhn), 121 B.R. 145, 154 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting Johns-Manville Corp. v. Asbestos Litig. Group (In re Johns-Manville
Corp.), 26 B.R. 420, 425 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) and GAF Corp. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In
re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26 B.R. 405 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 40 B.R. 219, 226
(S.D.N.Y. 1984)).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol49/iss4/3

2

Inman: All Debts Are Off?--Can the Bankruptcy Process Be Used to Release
NONDEBTOR PARI7ES

the Bankruptcy Code empowers courts6 to issue injunctions or thirdparty releases 7 discharging the liability of these nondebtors centers
primarily around conflicting interpretations of sections 105(a)8 and
524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.9
Section 105(a) confers broad equitable powers on bankruptcy courts
and provides that "[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
title." This section, in isolation, apparently gives a bankruptcy court
the power to enjoin creditors from suing nondebtor third parties if the
court deems it "necessary or appropriate" to carry out the purposes of
Chapter 11."
However, as a general rule, the equitable powers of bankruptcy
courts must be exercised within the confines of the Code. 2 Bankruptcy
courts do not have "free floating discretion" to create equitable rights
outside the Code. 3 Thus, section 105(a) cannot be used to authorize
any relief that is prohibited by another provision in the Code. 4 On its

6. In determining whether a court may issue a permanent injunction, some courts frame
the issue as a jurisdictional question. Others focus on the bankruptcy court's power under §
105(a) to enjoin such proceedings. See In re Sybaris Clubs Int'l, 189 B.R. 152, 155 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1995). This Note focuses on the bankruptcy courts' power to issue permanent injunctions
rather than jurisdiction issues. It usually is easy to establish jurisdiction because bankruptcy
courts have jurisdiction over all actions that could have any conceivable effect on the bankrupt
estate. See id.
7. Many courts refer to a third-party discharge as a third-party release, while some refer
to the discharge as a permanent injunction. See Meltzer, supra note 1, at 4 n.7. At least one
court has referred to the discharge as a "bar order." See Munford v. Munford, Inc. (In re
Munford, Inc.), 97 E3d 449, 454 (11th Cir. 1996). However, there is no functional difference
among the various terms. A permanent injunction preventing a creditor from suing a third party
is, in effect, a discharge of the third party's liability. See In re American Hardwoods, Inc., 885
E2d at 626. The terms are used interchangeably throughout this Note, depending upon the
context.
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994).
9. See id. § 524(e).
10. Id. § 105(a).
11. See In re Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660, 685 (Bankr. D.C.
1992) (stating that § 105(a) confers broad powers on bankruptcy courts). Section 105(a)'s broad
statutory directive that courts shall have the power to issue any injunction or order necessary to
effectuate a Chapter 11 plan is consistent with the general understanding that bankruptcy courts
are courts of equity. As such, they have broad authority to alter creditor-debtor relationships. See
id.
12. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) (stating that
"equitable powers... must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy

Code").
13. Sybaris Clubs Int'l, 189 B.R. at 156 (quoting In re Lloyd, 37 F.3d 271, 275 (7th Cir.
1994)).
14. See id.
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face, section 524(e) arguably restricts the broad equitable authority that
section 105(a) apparently confers on the courts. 5 Specifically, section
524(e) appears to prohibit courts from discharging the debts of
nondebtor third parties by providing that, "[e]xcept as provided in
subsection (a)(3) of this section, discharge of a debt of the debtor does
not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any
other entity for, such debt."' 6
Many courts have concluded that this provision is in direct conflict
with an interpretation of section 105(a) that allows courts to issue
permanent injunctions or third-party releases. 7 These courts have
interpreted section 524(e) to operate as an outright prohibition on such
injunctions and releases and have stated that the statutory language
makes clear that courts lack the power to discharge any debts other than
those belonging to the debtor. 8
II. APPROACHES TAKEN BY THE CIRCUITS

There are three principle lines of authority as to whether a court has
9
the power to confirm a plan that discharges nondebtors from liability.'
° courts hold that courts have the
'
The "permissive" or "pro-release"
power under section 105(a) to issue permanent injunctions or third-party
releases under certain factual circumstances.2 Other courts have
adopted a variation of the pro-release approach and suggest that a court
has the power to release nondebtor third parties only if each affected

15. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (1994).
16. Id.

17. For a list of courts adopting the no-release view, see Meltzer, supra note 1, at 3 n.6
(citing Resorts Int'l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1995);
Feld v. Zale Corp., (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 1995); In re Davis Broad, Inc., 176
B.R. 290 (M.D. Ga. 1994); Sun Valley Newspapers, Inc. v. Sun World Corp., (In re Sun Valley
Newspapers, Inc.), 171 B.R. 71 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994); Mellon Bank v. Siegel, 96 B.R. 505
(E.D. Pa. 1989); Sybaris Clubs Int'l, 189 B.R. at 152; American Hardwoods, 885 F.2d at 626;

Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1436 (9th Cir. 1985); Seaport Automotive Warehouse, Inc.
v. Rohnert Park Autoparts, Inc., 113 B.R. 610, 614-17 (9th Cir. 1990)).
18. See American Hardwoods, 885 F.2d at 625-26.

19. See Meltzer, supra note 1, at 2.
20. See id.

21. See Meltzer, supra note 1, at 2 n.2 (citing the following pro-release decisions:
Munford, 97 F.3d at 449; Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Ropes & Gray, 65 F.3d 973 (1st Cir. 1995);
In re Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 E3d 1043 (7th Cir. 1993); SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert
Group (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group), 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992); Menard-Sanford
v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989); MacArthur Co. v. JohnsManville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 E2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Master Mortgage
Inv. Fund, 168 B.R. 930 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); and Heron, 148 B.R. at 660).
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creditor consents to the releases.' Still other courts have adopted a
"restrictive" or "no release" view, concluding that section 105(a) does
not permit a bankruptcy court to permanently enjoin post-confirmation
lawsuits against nondebtors.' They argue that to allow a third-party
discharge under section 105(a) would directly contravene the more
specific proscription in section 524(e).24
A. Rationalefor Pro-ReleaseApproach
The "permissive" or "pro-release" approach has been adopted in
cases by the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, and District of Columbia
Circuits.25 Under this view, courts have the power to permanently
enjoin creditors from suing third-party nondebtors.26 Such an injunction
or release of third-party debts is binding on all creditors regardless of
whether such creditors consented to the releases.27
Courts adopting this view rely primarily on the plain language of
sections 524(e) and 105(a) in concluding that the court has the authority
to grant injunctions and releases.28 Section 524(e) provides that the
"discharge of the debt of a debtor does not affect the liability of any
other entity ... for, such debt."29 Pro-release courts seize on the
does not specifically preclude
ambiguity in the provision and note that3it
0
the discharge of a nondebtor's liability.
The plain language of the statute merely provides that the discharge
of the debtor's liability under a reorganization plan does not, by itself,

22. See Meltzer, supra note 1, at 2 n.4 (citing the following "release with consent"
decisions: Specialty Equip., 3 F.3d at 1043; In re West Coast Video Enter., 174 B.R. 906
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994); and In re Union Meeting Partners, 160 B.R. 757 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1993)).
23. See supra note 17 (listing courts adopting the no-release view).
24. See American Hardwoods, 885 E2d at 626.
25. See Meltzer, supra note 1, at 2; Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 937.
26. See Meltzer, supra note 1, at 2.
27. See id.
28. See Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 936-37. (stating that the plain language of the statute
supports the permissive view approach). When the plain language of a statute is clear, courts
should look no further. Section 524(e)'s language is clear. See id. at 936. It does not explicitly
prohibit the court from issuing a permanent injunction and should not be read in such a manner.
See id.
29. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (1994).
30. See Meltzer, supra note 1, at 6. Although many courts have interpreted § 524(e) to
preclude release of third-party nondebtors by a bankruptcy court, the statute does not by its
specific words preclude the discharge of a nondebtor "when it has been accepted and confirmed
as an integral part of reorganization." See A.H. Robins, 880 E2d at 702 (quoting Republic
Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046, 1050 (5th Cir. 1987)).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 4 [1997], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

affect the liability of other parties.3 The statute, however, does not
state that another party's debt cannot be discharged pursuant to other
provisions in the code. As one court recently stated:
[Section 524(e)] is merely declarative of the effect of a
discharge under § 524. It does not affect the ability of the
court to issue a permanent injunction under § 105(a) that
affects the liability of a non-debtor on the debtor's debt.
Such an injunction exists apart from a discharge under §
524. Section 524(e) contains no language of prohibition and
should not be interpreted to limit the court's power under
§ 105(a).... Nothing in either the language of § 105(a) or
§ 524(e) mandates that result.32
Pro-release courts that have compared the two sections conclude that
there is no conflict between them. They reason that section 524(e)
contains no language expressly limiting a court's powers to issue
injunctions or releases, whereas section 105(a) is broadly written and
gives bankruptcy courts the power to issue all orders necessary "to
advance the bankruptcy proceeding and matters related to the proceeding."33 Because the Supreme Court has indicated that courts should
interpret Code language so as to avoid conflict, 4 pro-release courts
suggest that interpreting section 524(e) as prohibiting all permanent
injunctions creates unnecessary conflict with section 105(a). They
note that, while a third-party discharge releasing a nondebtor from
liability may be "unwarranted in some circumstances, a per se rule
disfavoring all releases in a reorganization plan would be similarly
unwarranted, if not a misreading of the statute."3 6
As further support for the pro-release approach, pro-release courts
have pointed out that courts adopting the no-release view often
improperly rely on cases interpreting section 524(e)'s statutory
precursor, section 16 of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.37 Section 16

31. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (1994).
32. Heron, 148 B.R. at 687 (citation omitted).
33. See Myerson, 121 B.R. at 153-54 (citing In re Old Orchard Inv. Co., 31 B.R. 599, 601
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1983); MacArthur, 836 R2d at 89).
34. See MasterMortgage, 168 B.R. at 936 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc.,
489 U.S. 235, 240-42 & 245-47 (1989)) ("When the plain language is clear, the court need go
no further in its inquiry. Moreover, the court should interpret the [Bankruptcy] Code in a manner
that avoids conflict.").
35. See id. at 936 (citing Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 245-47) (stating that courts should
interpret the Bankruptcy Code in a manner that avoids conflict).
36. Specialty Equip., 3 F.3d at 1047.
37. See American Hardwoods, 885 F.2d at 625 (citing Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426
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provided that"[t]he liability of a person who is a co-debtor with, or
guarantor or in any matter a surety for, a bankrupt shall not be altered
by the discharge of such bankrupt."3 The 1898 Act additionally
provided that a corporation's discharge in bankruptcy "shall not release
its officers, the members of its board of directors or trustees or of other
similar controlling bodies, or its stockholders or members, as such, from
any liability...
Courts interpreting section 16 consistently held that bankruptcy
courts could not confirm reorganization plans calling for a discharge of
third-party debts.4' The language in section 16 supports the argument
that courts cannot discharge the liability of nondebtor third parties such
as officers, directors, and guarantors. Pro-release courts 4 ' have suggested, however, that "restrictive" view courts err in relying on the specific
proscriptions contained in section 16 of the 1898 Act.42 They argue that
reliance on section 16 is misplaced, and that courts should look
exclusively to the plain language in section 524(e), the current provision.43 Pro-release courts reason that the Supreme Court has indicated
in several decisions that a plain meaning analysis is to be used in
construing the Bankruptcy Code.' Thus, when the language of a statute
is clear, courts should go no further in their inquiry.45 Therefore, they
reason, to the extent that section 524(e) does not explicitly prohibit a
court from issuing a permanent injunction, the language is clear and
courts need not look at section 524(e)'s statutory precursor.
B. Rationalefor Release with Consent Approach
The "release with consent" approach has been adopted primarily by
courts in the Seventh Circuit.41 Courts adopting the release with
(9th Cir. 1985)).
38. Id. (quoting Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 16, 30 Stat. 550 (formerly codified at 11

U.S.C. § 34 (1976)).
39. See id. at 625 (citing Underhill, 769 F.2d at 1432 and quoting Act of June 22, 1938,
ch. 575, § 4(b), 52 Stat. 845 (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C. § 22(b) (1976))).
40. See id. at 625-26 (citing cases decided under § 16 which prohibited courts from

permanently enjoining suits against third-party nondebtors).
41. See Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 936 (stating that courts erred in looking at cases
decided under § 16, the statutory precursor to § 524(e)).
42. American Hardwoods, 885 F.2d at 625; Union Carbide Corp. v. Newboles, 686 F.2d

593, 595 (7th Cir. 1982).
43. See Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 936.
44. See id. (stating that courts should look to the plain language of statutes when
interpreting the Bankruptcy Code).

45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See Meltzer, supra note 1, at 2.
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consent approach48 apparently agree with the pro-release courts'
conclusion that section 524(e) does not bar a court from issuing
permanent injunctions discharging third parties from liability.4 9 However, release with consent courts have suggested that courts only have
authority to permanently enjoin creditor suits against nondebtor third
parties if each affected creditor consents to the plan.5' Commentators,
however, have suggested that, by garnering total creditor consent, the
third-party release provision would become enforceable under general
contract principles since all parties have consented to the terms. 51
Because the release with consent approach is more of a contract issue,
it is outside the scope of this discussion, except to the extent that it
lends support to the pro-release view that bankruptcy courts have the
power to issue third-party releases from liability under some circumstances.
C. Rationalefor No-Release Approach
Courts following the restrictive approach adopted by the Fifth and
Ninth circuits52 conclude that section 524(e) expressly prohibits
bankruptcy courts from issuing permanent injunctions or third-party
releases discharging the liability of nondebtors. 53 Like the pro-release
courts, the no-release courts purport to find support for their interpretation in the plain language of section 524(e) and section 105(a).54
First, the no-release courts concede that section 105(a) confers on
courts general equitable powers to order injunctions when necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Code.55 Nevertheless, they
point out that a bankruptcy court's equitable powers must be strictly
confined within the prescribed limits of the Code.56 Therefore, although
48. See id. at 2 n.4 (listing decisions adopting the release with consent approach); see also
supra note 22.
49. The "release with consent" courts essentially accept the pro-release courts' view that
bankruptcy courts have the power under § 105(a) to issue permanent injunctions or third-party
releases discharging the liability of nondebtors. See Specialty Equip., 3 F.3d at 1047.
50. See Meltzer, supra note 1, at 2 n.4 (listing decisions adopting the release with consent
approach); see also supra note 22.
51. See Meltzer, supra note 1, at 3 n.5 (implying that total creditor consent would make
the injunctions enforceable by virtue of contract law).
52. See id. at 3.
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., In re Market Square Inv., Inc., 163 B.R. 64, 66 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994).
55. See, e.g., American Hardwoods, 885 F.2d at 625.
56. See Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 206 (stating that "whatever equitable powers remain in the
bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy
Code."); Bear v. Cohen (In re Golden Plan of California, Inc.), 829 F.2d 705, 713 (9th Cir.
1986) (stating that a court's powers must be exercised within the confines of the Code); Johnson
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section 105(a) confers general equitable power, it cannot be used to
authorize relief inconsistent with a more specific provision such as
section 524(e)."
In Chapter 11 cases, the debtor receives a discharge as to all of its
debts as soon as a bankruptcy court confirms a reorganization plan.58
However, the no-release courts suggest that section 524(e) plainly limits
the scope of the discharge to the debtor.59 They point to the language
in section 524(e), which states that the "discharge of a debt of the
debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity... for[ ] such
debt."' The courts interpret this provision to deny a bankruptcy court
the ability to discharge debts belonging to any parties other than the
debtor.61 As such, the courts suggest that section 524(e) displaces any
general equitable powers the courts otherwise may have under section
105(a) to order permanent relief discharging the obligations of
nondebtors. 62
No-release courts also rely on section 524(e)'s statutory precursor to
support their view that courts do not have the power to permanently
enjoin creditors from suing nondebtor third parties. 63 They note that
section 524(e) is a reenactment of section 16 of the 1898 Bankruptcy
Act.' 4 Section 16 was more specific in its language than section 524(e)
and provided that the liability of third parties such as co-debtors,
guarantors, officers, directors, and trustees was not to be affected by the
discharge of the debtor's obligations.65 Accordingly, cases decided
under section 16 consistently held that a discharge in bankruptcy could

v. First Nat'l Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1983) (stating that, although bankruptcy courts
are essentially courts of equity, their broad equitable powers may only be exercised in a manner
consistent with all other provisions in the Code), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984).
57. See Landsing Diversified Properties-II v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Western
Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 601 (10th Cir. 1990) (concluding a bankruptcy court's
supplementary equitable powers under § 105(a) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent
with other, more specific proscriptions in the Code), modified sub nom., Abel v. West, 932 F.2d
898 (10th Cir. 1990); Southern Ry. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1985)
(stating that § 105(a) cannot be used to create rights not otherwise available by law); United
States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that § 105(a) does not allow a
bankruptcy court to create substantive rights that are prohibited by other more specific laws).
58. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1994).
59. See, e.g., Market Square, 163 B.R. at 66.
60. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 524(e)).
61. See id. (stating that "the discharge of the debtor's obligations does not contemplate
the same effect on the obligations and liabilities of third parties") (citation omitted).
62. See, e.g., American Hardwoods, 885 F.2d at 625.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
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not affect the liability of third parties.' Based on the decisions made
under section 16, no-release courts have concluded that they lack the
power to release third parties under the restrictions imposed by section
524(e).67 They suggest that section 16 clearly illustrated Congress'
intention to prevent courts from discharging the liabilities of such parties
and that the same reasoning should apply under section 524(e). 6' As
further support for the no-release view, courts suggest that releasing
third parties from liability is inconsistent with the purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code. 69 Bankruptcy courts are faced with the important task
of balancing the interests of creditors and debtors alike. Courts seek to
preserve the debtor's estate and maximize the collective recovery for all
creditors.7" The no-release courts indicate that nondebtor third parties
should not fall within the scope of bankruptcy courts' protection.7 ' One
court suggested that "[t]he bankruptcy laws do not operate as a method
to relieve a non-debtor from potential liabilities stemming from lawsuits
against them." 2 The courts reason that only a debtor who has invoked
and submitted itself to the bankruptcy process should be entitled to its
protections. 73 They suggest that Congress clearly did not intend to
extend the benefits of bankruptcy protection to "third-party bystanders."74 By enjoining creditors from suing third parties as well as
nondebtors, bankruptcy courts would effectively preclude creditors from
many, if not all, remedies.
III. PRO-RELEASE AND NO-RELEASE DECISIONS-ARE
THEY RECONCILABLE?

On first glance, it appears the circuits are deadlocked on the issue of
whether bankruptcy courts have the power to permanently enjoin
creditors from seeking relief from third-party nondebtors. One side
66. See, e.g., Weber v. Diversey Bldg. Corp. (In re Diversey Bldg. Corp.), 86 F.2d 456,
458 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 662 (1937); Newboles, 686 F.2d at 593; Sandy Ridge
Dev. Corp. v. Louisiana Nat'l Bank (In re Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp.), 881 F.2d 1346, 1351 (5th
Cir. 1989); R.I.D.C. Indus. Dev. Fund v. Snyder, 539 F.2d 487, 494 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1095 (1977).
67. See, e.g., American Hardwoods, 885 F2d at 625-26 (following cases decided under
§ 16 which prohibited courts from permanently enjoining suits against third-party nondebtors).
68. See id.
69. See Market Square, 163 B.R. at 66 (stating that "discharge of the [d]ebtor's obligations
does not contemplate the same effect on the obligations and liabilities of third parties").
70. See Myerson, 121 B.R. at 154.
71. See Market Square, 163 B.R. at 66.
72. See id. (citing In re Elsinore Shore Assoc., 91 B.R. 238 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1988)).
73. See Sybaris Clubs Int'l, 189 B.R. at 156 (quoting Landsing, 922 E2d at 600).
74. See id.; Feld, 62 E3d at 760 (stating that Congress did not intend "fresh start"
protection for third-party nondebtors).
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would allow third-party releases under certain circumstances, while the
other side disavows power in the courts to do so. However, a closer
review suggests that the differing outcomes between the circuits may be
as much a product of different factual settings as a result of divergent
interpretations of the law. Perhaps the factual circumstances that
persuaded pro-release courts to issue third-party releases simply did not
exist in the restrictive view decisions. Further, it appears that the norelease view courts are not as resolute as they purport to be on this
issue.
The following discussion is divided into two sections which explore
and contrast the most influential factors in the pro-release and no-release
decisions. Also included is an analysis of whether the courts are really
following different rules or whether the facts in the decisions are merely
distinguishable. Part B identifies additional factors influencing the norelease decisions that indicate that the no-release approach is not as
concrete as the courts suggest.
A. FactorsInfluencing Pro-ReleaseDecisions
No court has held that a third-party release provision is always
enforceable.' Courts that have allowed third-party releases or injunctions have only done so when they deemed it necessary to effectuate a
reorganization plan.76 Pro-release courts have not adhered to any rigid
test in determining whether a permanent injunction or third-party release
is necessary to a reorganization." However, five considerations seem
to weigh heavily in favor of allowing such injunctions or releases.78
First, a pro-release court may consider whether there is an identity
of interest between the debtor and the third party whose liability is to
be discharged.79 Generally courts look for some sort of indemnity
relationship between the debtor and third party such that any suit against
the third party may deplete the assets of the debtor estate. For
example, in a recent decision the court approved a reorganization plan
for a bankrupt partnership that enjoined creditors from directly suing an

75. See Meltzer, supra note 1, at 2 n.3.
76. See, e.g., Heron, 148 B.R. at 685.
77. See Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 936.
78. See id. at 935. These five factors are not an exclusive list of considerations. However,
they do appear frequently in courts' analysis of whether a permanent injunction or third-party
discharge is appropriate. See id.
79. See id. at 935-36.
80. See id. at 935 (citing A.H. Robins, 880 E2d at 694 (indemnity relationship between
debtor and third party); MacArthur, 837 R2d at 92 (indemnity relationship); Heron, 148 B.R.

at 669 (partnership right to reimbursement).
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individual partner."1 The court reasoned that the partner had an identity
of interest with the debtor/partnership because he had a direct claim for
contribution or reimbursement against the partnership for any and all of
his liabilities.82 Thus, any suit against the partner would, in effect, be
a suit against the bankrupt entity and would deplete the debtor estate.83
This, in turn, would hinder the entire reorganization. 4
Second, a court may look to whether the nondebtor to be discharged
from liability made substantial contributions to the reorganization
plan. 5 In considering this factor, courts have contemplated contributions of money, time, and a third party's willingness to forego claims
that the party may have against the debtor.8 6 In one recent case, the
third party released from liability contributed some $850,000 in proceeds
to the reorganization fund. 7 In another case, a third party discharged
from liability agreed to release over $51 million in claims it had against
the debtor.88
Courts have considered factors other than financial support in
determining whether a party has made substantial contributions to the
reorganization process or fund. They recognize that an effective
reorganization may be dependent on the cooperation of certain key
individuals or entities.89 For example, officers and directors in a debtor
organization may contribute substantial time, effort, and expertise to the
reorganization. Courts have concluded that such continued involvement
or cooperation with the reorganization process is a substantial contribution in and of itself.'
81. See Heron, 148 B.R. at 690.
82. See id. at 686.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See MasterMortgage, 168 B.R. at 935 (citing Specialty Equip., 3 F.3d at 1045 (thirdparty nondebtor extended additional $10 million to the reorganization fund); Drexel, 960 E2d
at 288-89 (creditor and debtor pooled their rights to collect judgments from the debtor's former
officers and directors into a $1.3 billion fund); A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 696 (third-party insurer
contributed assets to a claimant fund); In re AOV Indus., 792 F.2d 1140, 1142-43 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (third party released $51 million in claims and contributed another $4.5 million to the

reorganization).
86. See Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 935 n.5 (listing a number of cases where
contributions of money, time, and willingness to forego claims were considered).
87. See Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046, 1048 (5th Cir. 1987).
88. See AOV Indus., 792 F.2d at 1142.
89. See A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 700-02 (discharging the liability of the debtor
organization's directors, attorneys, product liability insurer, and its insurer's attorney); Drexel,
960 F.2d at 293 (concluding that claims against the debtor's officers and directors should be
enjoined in order to let the officers settle suits without fear that future suits may be filed against

them).
90. See, e.g., Monarch, 173 B.R. at 44.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol49/iss4/3

12

Inman: All Debts Are Off?--Can the Bankruptcy Process Be Used to Release
NONDEBTOR PARTIES

The third factor that courts may regard as significant is whether the
injunction or third-party release is essential to the debtor's reorganization.91 Courts suggest that there must be little likelihood that the
reorganization will succeed without the injunction barring suits against
the third-party nondebtors. For example, an injunction may be
deemed essential to a plan if nondebtors who would otherwise contribute
funding to the plan refuse to do so absent protection from postconfirmation lawsuits.93 Third parties who will not be protected against
future claims may not be forthcoming when asked to contribute
substantial sums of money and time to a reorganization plan.94
This factor was a prominent concern in the last decade in bankruptcy
proceedings stemming from the asbestos litigation cases. In MacArthur
v. Johns-Manville," the court was faced with a situation where the
parties funding the reorganization plan would not have cooperated
without protection from future claims.96 In MacArthur, the Second
Circuit reviewed a plan requiring that all claims against the asbestos
manufacturer proceed against a trust fund established during the
reorganization process.97 The plan permanently enjoined the claimants
from proceeding against the Manville Corporation (debtor) and
Manville's insurers (third parties) who had made substantial contribu-

91. See Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 935 (citing Drexel, 960 F.2d at 289, 293
(concluding that there could be no reorganization without principal creditor settlement); A.H.
Robins, 880 E2d at 702 (stating that the injunction was essential to the reorganization);
MacArthur, 837 F.2d at 90 (suggesting that the injunction was the cornerstone of the
reorganization plan); Heron, 148 B.R. at 667 (stating that the injunction was the "sine qua non"
of the plan); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Rolleston (In re Ionosphere Clubs Inc.), 124 B.R.635,
642 (S.D.N.Y 1991) (holding that the injunction was necessary for a successful reorganization);
MacArthur, 68 B.R. at 625 (observing there would be no meaningful reorganization without
protecting the parties' interests); MacDonald/Assocs. v. Stillwagon (In re MacDonald/Assocs.),
54 B.R. 865, 870 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1985) (stating that the debtor was unable to reorganize without
an injunction barring suits against nondebtor third parties)).
92. See id.
93. See Monarch Capital, 65 F3d at 979-80; A.H. Robins, 880 E2d at 702.
94. See Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 938. In this decision, the court discharged a third
party from liability who had made substantial contributions to a reorganization plan. See id. at
937-38. The court found that the third party had contributed some $19 million in assets to the
reorganization fund. See id. at 938. Without this contribution, the debtor could not have
reorganized. See id. The third party surely would not have contributed $19 million to facilitate
the debtor's reorganization without some protection from future suits. See id. The court stressed
that the nondebtors' contributions to the plan and the injunction protecting these third parties
from future suits comprised the "cornerstone" of the entire reorganization. See id.
95. 837 E2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988).
96. See id. at 90.
97. See id. at 90-91.
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tions to the trust fund.98 The court concluded that the insurers' contributions to the trust fund and the injunction agreement were essential to
a workable reorganization.9 9 It reasoned that the insurance companies
contributed over $700 million to the trust fund, without which the
Manville Corporation could not have reorganized.' The court stated
that to allow direct actions against the insurance companies would
adversely affect the debtor's estate because the insurers would refuse to
fund the reorganization."0 The insurers would not contribute millions
of dollars to the Manville reorganization if they could be subjected to
direct suits by the claimants as well."°
Courts also may consider two additional factors in determining the
appropriateness of an injunction or release. First, they may consider
03
whether a substantial number of creditors agree to injunction.
Second, they may consider whether the plan provides a mechanism for
the payment of the creditors' claims affected by the injunction." Most
courts have required that creditors "overwhelmingly" vote in favor of
allowing the release or injunction."° According to some courts,
obtaining approval from affected creditors is the most important factor
in deciding whether to enjoin creditors from suing third parties." A
few courts even require unanimous creditor approval of the third-party

98. See id. at 90.
99. See id. at 94.
100. See id. at 93-94.
101. See Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 935 (citing Specialty Equip., 3 E3d at 1044-45
(plan provided for payment in full of priority and unsecured claims); Drexel, 960 E2d at 288
(impaired parties received a pro rata share in fund established to satisfy their claims); A.H.
Robins, 880 F2d at 697 (plan created claimant fund estimated to pay in full all tort claimants
affected by the injunction); MacArthur, B.R. at 621 (plan created a trust out of which most
claims would be paid)).
102. See id.
103. See Specialty Equip., 3 E3d at 104445 (plan provided for payment in full of priority
and unsecured claims); Drexel, 960 E2d at 288 (impaired parties received a pro rata share in
fund established to satisfy their claims); A.H. Robins, 880 E2d at 697 (plan created claimant
fund estimated to pay in full all tort claimants affected by the injunction); MacArthur, 68 B.R.
at 621 (plan created a trust out of which most claims would be paid).
104. See Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 935 (citing Specialty Equip., 3 E3d at 1045
(creditors and interest holders entitled to vote "overwhelmingly" accepted the proposed plan
treatment); A.H. Robins, 880 F2d at 698 (94% of tort claimants affected by the injunction voted
to accept the plan); AOV Indus., 792 F2d at 1143 (creditors overwhelmingly accepted the plan
with over 90% of the creditors in each class voting to approve the plan); Heron, 148 B.R. at 660
(only I of 63 creditors and 8 of 93 partners objected to the injunction); MacArthur, 68 B.R. at
621 (plan overwhelmingly accepted by creditors entitled to vote on the plan)).
105. See id.
106. See, e.g., id. at 938.
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injunctions or releases."° Additionally, courts have stated that whether
a plan provides for payment of most creditor claims is also significant."° This seems to be largely a fairness consideration based on the
concern that a third party should not be discharged when the creditors'
rightful claims will not be compensated.
In conclusion, there are primarily three situations in which courts are
likely to allow permanent injunctions under section 105(a):
(1) where an indemnity relationship between the debtor and
nondebtor third party is such that a finding of liability
against the nondebtor would be imputed to the debtor,
thereby depleting the debtor estate.' °
(2) where the nondebtor third party will be a substantial
source of funding for the debtor's reorganization;"' or
(3) where the nondebtor third party's time, energy, and
commitment to the debtor are necessary for an effective
reorganization."'
A court additionally may consider the level of agreement among
creditors as to the necessity of an injunction, as well as general issues
of fairness to creditors who hold legitimate claims.
B. FactorsInfluencing No-Release Decisions
Few if any of the factors that influence the pro-release decisions
were present in key no-release cases."' The Ninth Circuit's decision
in In re American Hardwoods, Inc."' is perhaps the seminal ruling for
courts adopting the "restrictive" or "no release approach."" 4 In
American Hardwoods, the court invalidated a reorganization plan that
proposed to release nondebtor guarantors from liability by permanently
enjoining creditor suits against them." 5 The court distinguished the

107. See Meltzer, supra, note 1 at 2-3 nn.4-5 (citing Specialty Equip., 3 F.3d at 1043; In

re West Coast Video Enter., 174 B.R. 906 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994); In re Union Meeting
Partners, 160 B.R. 757 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993)); see also related discussion in section II.B. of
this Note.
108. See, e.g., Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 935-36.
109. See Meltzer, supra note 1, at 20.
110. See id.

111. See id.
112. See Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 936 (describing restrictive view analysis as
concentrating on precedents under previous versions of the Bankruptcy Code).
113. American Hardwoods, 885 F.2d at 621.
114. See id. at 625-26 (concluding that § 524(e) expressly prohibits courts from issuing
permanent injunctions that discharge the liabilities of any nondebtors).
115. See MasterMortgage, 168 B.R. at 937 (citing American Hardwoods, 885 F2d at 622).
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facts before it from the facts in a Fourth Circuit pro-release case."" In
contrast to the pro-release case, the American Hardwoods nondebtor
guarantors did not offer to contribute any assets to the debtor's reorganization.'17 Nor did the debtor allege that permanently enjoining suits
against the nondebtor guarantors was in any sense "essential to the plan"
or that the entire reorganization "hinged" on it."' Further, the creditors
9
affected by the injunction did not overwhelmingly approve the plan."
In fact, the only creditor to be affected by the injunction did not approve
of the plan."
Similarly, in In re Western Real Estate,"' the factors considered
important to pro-release courts were not present. In that case, the Tenth
Circuit refused to endorse a reorganization plan that proposed to enjoin
a single attorney from the collection of a contingency fee against a third
party." The third party protected by the injunction did not provide
new and substantial contributions to the reorganized debtor.'" Nor was
24
the injunction shown to be essential to the reorganization. Further,
the attorney, the sole affected creditor, did not agree to the plan's
treatment of his claim."
As these decisions illustrate, the facts in the pro-release and norelease view decisions are disparate. The five factors cited throughout
' are not found anywhere in the facts of cases
pro-release decisions 26
adopting the no-release view. 27 This calls into question the suggestion
made by the Ninth Circuit and other no-release courts that section
524(e) prevents a court from discharging nondebtors under any
circumstances.'"
Indeed, there are many indications in the no-release opinions, which
suggest that the courts are not as resolute in this position as they purport
to be. For example, in American Hardwoods, the court went into great
detail in distinguishing the facts before it from the facts in cases
permitting third-party releases.'29 The court acknowledged that the five
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See American Hardwoods, 885 E2d at 626 (discussing A.H. Robins, 880 E2d at 694).
See id. at 622.
See id. at 627.
See id.
See Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 937 (citingAmerican Hardwoods,885 E2d at 622).
Landsing, 922 F2d at 592.
See MasterMortgage, 168 B.R. at 937 (discussing Landsing, 922 R2d at 594-95).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See supra pt. III.A.
See supra notes 112-25 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., American Hardwoods, 885 F2d at 626.
See id. at 626-27.
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factors present in pro-release decisions did not exist in American Hardwoods."3 The court stated that, even if it adopted the reasoning of the
pro-release decisions, "it would not dictate a different result."131 The
court reasoned that, unlike the pro-release decisions, American Hardwoods presented no unusual facts where the permanent injunction was
shown to be essential to the plan, the creditors did not approve of the
injunction, and the parties to be discharged had not made substantial
13
contributions to the reorganization process. 1
While the American Hardwoods court held that section 524(e)
expressly prohibits third-party releases,' the court's discussion of the
factual circumstances suggests that the court merely concluded that an
injunction was unwarranted on those particular facts. If the case stands
for the proposition that section 524(e) prohibits third-party injunctions
in all circumstances, then that court's lengthy discussion distinguishing
the facts before it from the facts in pro-release cases is superfluous.
Presumably, if section 524(e) expressly prohibits third-party releases, it
should prohibit them on any facts.
In recent decisions, courts appear to have taken heed of the different
factual surroundings existing in pro-release and restrictive view
decisions. They reject the no-release view that section 524(e) prohibits
courts from issuing permanent injunctions under section 105(a) in all
instances." Rather, they conclude that the facts in the no-release
decisions did not warrant an injunction or release.'35
C. Other Indications the Restrictive
Approach Is Not Mandatory
There are other indications in the no-release decisions that cast doubt
on the view that section 524(e) prevents courts from discharging third
parties under any circumstances. First, the no-release courts generally
uphold temporary and preliminary injunctions enjoining suits against
certain nondebtor third parties. 136 Even the Ninth Circuit, which has

130. See id. at 627.
131. Id. at 626.
132. See id. at 627.
133. See id. at 626.
134. See Heron, 148 B.R. at 687 ("[Mhe facts that led the American Hardwoods court to
find relief under § 105(a) to be inconsistent with § 524(e) do not exist in this case.... To the
extent the court in In re American Hardwoods,Inc. holds that 524(e) expressly limits the power
of the court under § 105(a) this court respectfully disagrees.") (citation omitted); see also Master
Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 936-37 (stating that "the five factors considered important to permissive
view courts were not present in the restrictive view cases").
135. See id.
136. See, e.g., American Hardwoods,885 F2d at 624-25 (stating that § 105 "empowers the
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held without exception that section 524(e) prevents third-party discharg37
es, allows preliminary and temporary releases or injunctions. The
American Hardwoods court stated that section 105(a) clearly empowers
courts to issue preliminary injunctions to protect the debtor and aid in
administration of the bankruptcy estate.' Thus, the court apparently
agreed that section 524(e) does not prohibit preliminary injunctions
issued pursuant to section 105(a).' 39 The court essentially stated in one
40
breath that section 524(e) always prohibits third-party injunctions,
and in the next breath concluded that preliminary injunctions are
permissible. 4 ' The court did not, however, make any meaningful
distinction between the. treatment of preliminary and permanent
injunctions, 42 other than to suggest that preliminary injunctions may
be necessary to preserve the debtor estate. 43
Significantly, the American Hardwoods court failed to recognize that
post-confirmation suits against nondebtor third parties can have just as
much effect on the debtor's estate as pre-confirmation suits. As
discussed previously, whether third parties will be subjected to postconfirmation suits plays a significant role in their willingness to
contribute to or cooperate with the reorganization or funding of the
debtor estate.'"
IV. CONCLUSION

The pro-release approach espoused by the First, Second, Fourth,
Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits is the better reasoned approach for
several reasons. First, the plain language of section 105(a) and section
524(e) supports this conclusion.4 5 Second, if the decision whether to
enjoin suits against third parties is discretionary, courts have the
necessary flexibility to act in the best interest of all parties concerned.
Third, it has not been sufficiently argued or demonstrated that to give
courts the power to permanently enjoin suits against nondebtors will
provide a mechanism of escape for nondebtors and unfairly prejudice
claimants. Finally, there are many indications in decisions where
court to enjoin preliminarily a creditor from continuing an action or enforcing a state court
judgment against a nondebtor prior to confirmation of a plan").

137. See id. at 625.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See id.
See id.
See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
See American Hardwoods, 885 F2d at 624-25.

143. Id. at 625.
144. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 29 & 33 and accompanying text.
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injunctive relief was denied that the no-release courts may allow
injunctions under some circumstances.
The plain language of section 105(a) and section 524(e) suggests that
courts have the authority to permanently enjoin suits against nondebtor
third parties." Section 105(a) is broadly written and gives courts the
power to issue all orders necessary to effectuate a reorganization. 47
Section 524(e) does not clearly affect this power. Section 524(e) merely
provides that the discharge of the debtor's debt under a reorganization
plan does not, by itself, discharge the liabilities of any other parties. 48
Courts should not distort the
plain language of the rules and find
149
conflict where there is none.
Bankruptcy courts are courts of equity."5 Congress has provided
them with broad discretionary power under section 105(a) to act in the
best interests of all parties affected by a reorganization. 15' To conclude
that section 524(e) prohibits a court from enjoining suits against third
parties in every instance would be to deprive them of an important tool
in effecting reorganizations. The pro-release approach, on the other
hand, gives courts the flexibility to allow third-party injunctions or
releases in specific factual contexts where the injunction is necessary to
protect the interests of the parties involved.'
Fears that the pro-release approach will provide a mechanism of
escape for nondebtors and will unfairly prejudice claimants are
unwarranted. First, even the pro-release courts state that a third-party
injunction or release should be a rare occurrence, allowable only under
extraordinary circumstances.' In fact, one pro-release court recently
stated, "[t]he Court cautions the Gentle Reader that a permanent
injunction is a rare thing, indeed, and only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances in which [the five factors discussed previously] are
present will this Court even entertain the possibility of a permanent
injunction."'" 4
When a court enjoins creditors from suing third-party nondebtors, the
third parties are not truly released from liability. In virtually all prorelease decisions, the protected third parties contributed substantial sums

146. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994); see also id. § 524(e).

147. See id. § 105(a).
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
thing and
154.

See id. § 524(e).
See Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 936 (citing Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 240-42).
See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984).
See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994).
See supra pt. II.A.
See Master Mortgage, 168 B.R. at 937 (stating that a permanent injunction is a rare
will only be permissible upon a showing of exceptional circumstances).
Id.
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of money to the debtor's reorganization. 5 They, in effect, paid their
debts by channeling money into the reorganization plan which, in turn,
provided a mechanism for payment of creditor claims. To suggest that
their liability was simply excused or that creditor claims were prejudiced
in those cases is incorrect. Third-party funding of the reorganization is
precisely the mechanism which allows creditors to be paid in the first
place. Without such funding, creditors would receive nothing in many
cases. Therefore, the concern that third-party discharges will become a
mechanism for excusing liabilities is unfounded.
Finally, there are many indications that no-release courts already
accept that third-party injunctions may be appropriate under some
factual circumstances. Overall, both pro-release and no-release courts
6
generally engage in a lengthy comparison of the facts." By carefully
distinguishing the facts before them from the facts in the pro-release
decisions, the no-release courts indicate, at the very least, that the nodischarge rule is not a per se prohibition." 7 If section 524(e) truly
prohibited third-party injunctions or releases on its face, presumably no
further analysis would be necessary. If the no-release courts refuse to
allow injunctions or releases merely because the facts do not warrant
them, they should not recognize section 524(e) as an outright prohibition.
How a no-release court might respond if presented with a case where
the factors considered significant by pro-release courts were present
poses some interesting issues. It likely would be difficult for the
restrictive view courts-the Ninth Circuit in particular-to retreat from
their strong language that section 524(e) prohibits a court from releasing51
a nondebtor third party from liability under any circumstances.
While dicta suggests that the Ninth Circuit may approve of permanent
injunctions under extraordinary circumstances, that court recently held
steadfast to its position that section 524(e) always bars third-party
releases. 159 Rather than overrule past decisions or officially adopt the
pro-release position, perhaps the no-release courts will simply await
word from the Supreme Court. The issue will remain unsettled until that
word comes, or until a no-release court is actually presented with a case
in which the factual circumstances clearly warrant an injunction or
release.
155. See supra pt. III.A.
156. See supra pt. III.B.
157. See supra pt. LI.B.
158. See American Hardwoods, 885 F.2d at 626.
159. See, e.g., Resorts Int'l v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 E3d 1394 (9th Cir.
1995) (reaffirming the court's holding in American Hardwoods that § 524(e) bars third-party
releases in all situations).
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